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Introduction 
 
 
European Disintegration: 
Too Much to Lose 
Bettina Rudloff and Evita Schmieg 
For decades the search for deeper integration characterised the European Union. Today 
the discussion revolves around disintegration. It began with the Greek debt crisis, but 
only came into its own with summer 2015’s major influx of refugees and the reimposi-
tion of controls at certain borders. In June the United Kingdom will vote on whether to 
remain in the EU. In April, Dutch voters expressed their criticism of the EU through their 
referendum on the Association Agreement with the Ukraine, which may hinder its ratifi-
cation. These developments are generating uncertainty over the Union’s future. Closer 
examination of the common trade policy and the single market, as one of the central 
pillars of European integration, reveals that all member-states would have a great deal 
to lose if the Union were to break apart. 
 
A theoretical break-up of the European 
Union would involve a series of escalating 
steps, successively reversing existing inte-
gration measures. Following a partial or 
eventually even complete dissolution of the 
Schengen area, individual countries such as 
the United Kingdom might leave the single 
European market. Within the Union, too, 
the four fundamental freedoms (freedom of 
movement for goods, services, persons and 
capital) could be abolished. Ultimately, Euro-
pean free trade and the common trade policy 
could be completely called into question. 
Dissolution of Schengen 
The Schengen agreement came into force in 
1995 to realise free movement of persons 
within the single European market (although 
the United Kingdom and Ireland did not 
join, and Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus and 
Romania are not yet full members). It is 
flanked by police and judicial cooperation 
and harmonised asylum arrangements, 
designed to create a common area of secu-
rity and justice. The agreement provides for 
temporary suspension, as presently prac-
tised in certain places in connection with 
the refugee question. A permanent suspen-
sion could ensue if the EU failed to find a 
shared response to the refugee problem. 
The reintroduction of border controls is 
already proving costly. A study by the Ber-
telsmann Stiftung estimates the additional 
total financial burden in Germany alone 
at up to €235 billion in the ten years from 
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2016 to 2025. The Ifo-Institut reaches simi-
lar conclusions, putting the cost at between 
€17 and €132 per citizen and year, depend-
ing on the scale of controls. Citizens and 
businesses would suffer financial losses as 
cross-border tourism and shopping would 
decline if long waits were expected at bor-
der crossings. This would also inhibit the 
social and cultural exchange that is pres-
ently flourishing especially in Europe’s 
border regions, and exacerbate divergences 
in the Union’s labour markets. For busi-
nesses, border delays act like a tariff and 
make it harder for foreign purchasers and 
investors to visit. According to sources cited 
in the aforementioned Bertelsmann study, 
the associated costs amount to 1.4 to 3 per-
cent of the value of the goods. Assuming a 
3 percent increase in the cost of imports, 
€1.43 billion in GDP would be lost EU-wide 
over the ten years between 2016 and 2025. 
That corresponds to the annual GDP of 
Italy. All these consequences of border con-
trols would also be felt by companies from 
third countries like China and the United 
States trading or investing in Europe. 
Individual Exits from Trade Policy 
and Single Market 
Non-ratification of free trade agreements by 
individual member-states has now become 
a possibility. The Dutch rejection of the  
EU–Ukraine agreement in April 2016 raises 
question marks over the common trade 
policy. In view of the increasingly heated 
debate over the Transatlantic Trade and 
Investment Partnership (TTIP), such a devel-
opment is not entirely unexpected. 
Member-states are naturally also able to 
withdraw from the internal market. The 
European Union possesses a wide range of 
options for regulating external protections 
and internal trade vis-à-vis third states. Of 
these, the most relevant for the single mar-
ket are production and marketing stand-
ards. Even between EU member-states, dif-
ferences in standards have persisted over 
time and the outcome of the single Euro-
pean market is by no means a complete 
levelling of these differences across the 
entire Union. It is rather a situation of 
extensive mutual recognition, also with 
respect to third states. The principle of 
mutual recognition originates in a ground-
breaking ruling by the European Court of 
Justice in 1979. From today’s perspective 
the case was a curious one involving cassis 
de Dijon, a liqueur containing less than 
25 percent alcohol. The Court ruled that 
if it was legal in France it was also legal 
throughout the European Union, and its 
sale must therefore also be permitted in 
Germany. In addition to such internal mar-
ket aspects, there are also various shared 
arrangements for external tariffs. 
If individual members were to leave the 
Union, negotiations could be held on the 
shape of the new relationship. The follow-
ing existing models could serve as orienta-
tion: 
 
“Norwegian model”: free trade area with 
internal market. Under the European Eco-
nomic Area (EEA), trade between the EU 
and EFTA members Norway, Liechtenstein 
and Iceland is largely free of tariffs, while 
each side sets its own tariffs for trade 
with third countries. Such a free trade area 
requires complex and expensive controls 
of origin designations, in order to avoid 
imports from third states being routed 
through the country with the weakest ex-
ternal protections to also benefit from duty 
free-trade within the EEA. Agricultural and 
fishery products are regarded by both sides 
as sensitive, and excluded from free trade 
in the EEA. The states of the European Free 
Trade Area (EFTA) must satisfy all relevant 
production standards for their exports to 
the EU, but have to observe fewer EU regu-
lations than EU member-states do. Each 
year Norway adopts about three hundred 
new EU regulations, out of an average total 
of roughly one thousand. Although EFTA 
states enjoy observer status in important 
organisations like the European Food Safety 
Authority (EFSA), they have no vote in 
standard-setting decisions. 
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“Swiss model”: narrowly defined free trade 
area with internal market. Switzerland is 
a member of EFTA, but not of the EEA. It 
forms a free trade area with the EU, where 
each side retains its own tariffs. Switzer-
land accepts large parts of the single mar-
ket for products listed in detail in sectoral 
agreements. Here again, the agricultural 
sector is excluded, as is influence over rule-
making. Freedom of movement of persons 
has frequently given rise to conflict, but 
the 2002 agreement remains in force for 
the present, even after the successful Swiss 
referendum against “mass immigration” 
in 2014. 
 
Neighbourhood model: (seeking) customs 
union. A customs union goes further than 
a free trade area, with jointly set external 
tariffs. Here the non-member state loses the 
freedom to define its own customs policies. 
A customs union with Turkey was agreed 
in 1995, to be implemented in stages. Agri-
cultural products were excluded. Under the 
agreement many tariffs between the EU 
and Turkey have been abolished, and it is 
intended for both sides to apply identical 
external tariffs – the EU’s ones. A customs 
union with nine further Mediterranean 
countries is also proposed, but has been 
obstructed primarily by large differences 
between the tariffs of the Mediterranean 
countries themselves. Although a common 
market with shared standard-setting is not 
proposed, EU import requirements must 
be observed. 
 
Third state model: “internal market à la 
carte” with national customs policies. 
States that left the EU could keep their own 
tariffs, or negotiate their future relations 
with one another and/or with the remain-
ing smaller EU. Even in the case of a com-
pletely re- nationalised external trade 
policy, aspects of the single market such 
as harmonisation or mutual recognition 
of third-state technical standards could 
continue to be defined jointly. Even before 
the negotiations over the Transatlantic 
Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) 
this was already practised with the United 
States in certain sectors and individual 
standards, for example with respect to tele-
communications and civil aviation safety. 
Dissolution of Single Market and 
Free Trade Area 
The logical next step would be for all the 
EU member-states to nationalise their trade 
policy and abolish the four fundamental 
freedoms. That would have serious con-
sequences for trade, investment and pros-
perity in all member-states. It is estimated 
that the single market has permanently 
increased GDP by about 2 to 3 percent. And 
it is thought that exports from EU member-
states are today 8 percent higher than they 
would have been without European inte-
gration. Most importantly, the cross-border 
value chains that have emerged would erode 
if the single market was dissolved. While ex-
isting jointly set standards would continue 
to apply, the member-states would create 
new ones moving forward on their own 
account. And if tariffs were to be reintro-
duced between European countries, the EU 
would no longer even be a free trade area. 
Extreme Case: Dissolution of Customs 
Union and Common Trade Policy 
The complete dissolution of the customs 
union and the common trade policy would 
be the final step of disintegration. In that 
event, every EU member-state would set its 
own external tariffs and negotiate its own 
trade agreements with third states. The Euro-
pean Commission’s Directorate General for 
Trade would be obsolete. The countries of 
the Union would not only control their 
own national borders, but also expand their 
national customs services and trade admin-
istration. Individual member-states would 
probably have to renegotiate existing trade 
agreements like the one with South Korea. 
Disintegration would create endless 
questions needing clarification. The known 
examples in other regions of the world are 
few and generally negative. 
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Repercussions and Conclusions 
The temporary suspension of Schengen and 
the ensuing inconveniences for EU citizens 
and businesses affect precisely the area 
of integration that many experience as 
the most positive and tangible European 
achievement. Externally too, for politicians, 
tourists and potential investors outside the 
Union, the current suspension creates the 
disagreeable impression that Europe is 
unable to cope with its problems and now 
faces political and economic collapse. 
The dissolution of the European Union 
would cause relatively little harm in the 
short term. But in the medium and long 
term the dismantling of European value 
chains would certainly erode the competi-
tiveness of European products on the global 
market. The further markets drifted apart 
through national actions such as setting 
separate technical or health standards, the 
stronger this effect would be. Here it is 
especially pertinent that new integration 
areas are emerging in other regions of the 
world such as Asia. Although it is today a 
very significant economic space – and 
globally the most highly integrated – the 
EU would become dramatically less attrac-
tive. The single market currently attracts 
14 percent more foreign investment than 
comparable non-EU countries. The interest 
of European and overseas investors in what 
would then be smaller markets would 
shrink: even Germany accounts for only 
just over one-fifth of the EU’s total GDP. 
Exacerbating the problems, a drop in in-
vestments would occur even if investors 
only perceive the risk of further European 
disintegration steps, as can presently be 
observed in the United Kingdom. 
A growing reticence among member 
states to ratify free trade agreements limits 
the Union’s possibilities to conclude im-
portant trade and investment agreements, 
makes it a less attractive negotiating part-
ner, and could lead to its increasing mar-
ginalisation in the global economy. It might 
become necessary to explore whether the 
parts of such agreements relating to trade 
in goods could still come into force on the 
basis of ratification by the European Parlia-
ment. Such legal niceties aside, the funda-
mental political question is how to respond 
to the erosion of confidence in Europe’s 
democracy and institutions exposed by the 
discussion over TTIP and the emerging pos-
sibility of member-states declining to ratify 
free trade agreements – despite the full and 
proper involvement of the European Coun-
cil, European Parliament and national 
parliaments in the negotiating process. This 
democratic deficit needs to be resolved 
politically. 
The EU today possesses considerable in-
fluence, both in bilateral negotiations such 
as on TTIP and in international bodies like 
the World Trade Organisation. Although 
smaller member-states might be able to pro-
file their own positions more clearly after 
leaving the EU, their influence on outcomes 
would be marginal. And that economic 
weakness would also rub off on the political 
arena, when one considers that trade is the 
flagship of European integration. If this 
founders, strength and credibility in other 
areas will suffer too. Given that the political 
Union is irrevocably tied to trade integra-
tion, it would also be threatened. 
Any European disintegration going 
further than a temporary suspension of 
Schengen would therefore be highly irratio-
nal. The expected losses would far exceed 
any possible gains. That applies for differ-
ent reasons to all member-states. In the cur-
rent atmosphere of growing anti-European 
sentiment and nationalisation of politics, 
unequivocal attention of each citizen must 
be drawn to the potential consequences. 
The citizens of the EU should be made aware 
of how much is at stake. 
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